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MORTON HORWITZ AND HIS CRITICS: A
CONFLICT OF NARRATIVES
Robert W. Gordon*
This Symposium contemplates a master scholar and his work, but happily
not in an obituary way. The scholar is not only very much still with us, but briskly
plugging away at his massive Holmes Devise History of the Warren Court, in
debonair defiance of the curse of doom that has struck down so many
predecessors in their quest to finish Holmes Devise Histories of the Supreme
Court. Since this is the kind of occasion that puts one in a reminiscent frame of
mind, I want to recall for you the place and time in which I first saw Morton
Horwitz, a seminar room at Harvard Law School in the fall of 1969, where he was
teaching his first course in American Legal History as a Warren Fellow, and I was
a second-year law student. The time was a slumbering winter of American Legal
History. A brilliant, but brief Indian summer of the field had ended. Mark
DeWolfe Howe had died in 1967. Willard Hurst, who continued to be
astonishingly productive for the next twenty years, had already published his best
work.' Few could guess at the new growth gestating in the frozen ground-the
new legal histories of William Nelson, Harry Scheiber, Lawrence Friedman,
Morton Horwitz, and Ted White among others-and the luxuriant spring and
summer of the field to come. In Morton Horwitz's classroom, the instructor paced
the room like a restless leopard, if one can imagine a chain-smoking leopard. The
young Winston Churchill once remarked earnestly to a young woman, "We are all
worms. But I do believe that I am a glow-worm." 2 This is how we felt about the
young, febrile, Morty Horwitz. He glowed. He was then assembling the pieces of
the story that eventually became The Transformationof American Law, 1780-1860
("Transformationr').? Some of us in that class had already read through what was
then the slender bibliography-not more than twenty or thirty books and articles
in all-of works worth reading in American Legal History; and had an inkling of

* Johnston Professor of Law and History, Yale Law School.
1. James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (Little, Brown & Co.
1950); James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United
States (U. Wisc. Press 1967); James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth:the Legal History of the
Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press 1964) [hereinafter Law and
Economic Growth].
2. Roy Jenkins, Churchill: a Biography 137 (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2001) (quoting Violet
Bonham Carter).
3. Morton J. Horwitz, The TransformationofAmerican Law, 1780-1860 (Harv. U. Press 1977).
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the originality and daring of the argument Horwitz was developing before us.
Stanley Katz was in the class that fall (already an established historian, he was
spending the year at Harvard as a liberal arts fellow). One day we walked out of
the class together-it was the class in which Horwitz explained how negligence
had evolved out of neglect of quasi-contractual duty and been transmuted to mean
actions in excess of statutory jurisdiction and thence to something like "fault"and looked at each other; and Stan said what was on both our minds: "something
extraordinary happened in that class today."
When TransformationI appeared in 1977, it made a big splash-perhaps not
quite as big as Charles Beard's Economic Interpretation of the Constitution
(1913)-but certainly big for a book about legal history, and a pretty complicated
and densely written book at that. Historians loved it and gave it the Bancroft
Prize in 1978. Some legal historians liked it too-Willard Hurst and (at least
initially) Harry Scheiber gave it favorable though cautiously qualified reviews.4
But many of the reviews from lawyers were negative. There were criticisms both
of the broad substantive arguments and of various matters of detail. Some of
these were well taken, others less so. I will not undertake in this short essay a
comprehensive survey of the reviews. That task has already been admirably
performed, first by Wythe Holt twenty years ago, and with wit, spirit and fresh
insight by Laura Kalman in this Symposium. 5 But I would like to try to identify
and comment on some general themes of the critiques.
In my view the most justified of the general critiques was that Horwitz had
written an intellectual history of legal ideas and doctrines, and then had
extrapolated from that history conclusions about social effects. The thesis was, of
course that judges of the early republic, working in concert with commercial
interests, had worked a revolution in property, tort, and commercial law, which
had redistributed wealth away from groups identified as "farmers, workers and
consumers" and into the hands of "entrepreneurs." Once this was accomplished,
the judges had hardened the new legal status quo into one of absolute rights, in
order to protect the property thus expropriated and transferred against further
populist redistribution. The most justified critique, I think, was the simple one
that Horwitz's evidence, being all of change internal to the legal system and drawn
exclusively from appellate cases and treatises, could not support strong
conclusions about social alliances and social effects. The law on the books is not
the law in action. If he had looked for such evidence, I believe, it would have
confirmed his argument about alliances and effects in some respects, and made it
problematic in others.
The thesis about alliances would surely not be hard to support. Proving that
the top bracket of American lawyers from 1800 onward-the lawyers who tended
to become judges-were allied with, or at least held views in common with,

4. Willard Hurst, Book Review, 21 Am. J. Leg. History 175 (1977); Harry N. Scheiber, Back to "the
Legal Mind"? DoctrinalAnalysis and the History of Law, 5 Rev. in Am. History 458 (1977).
5. Wythe Holt, Morton Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History, 23 Wm.&
Mary L. Rev. 663 (1982); Laura Kalman, Transformations,37 Tulsa L. Rev. 849 (2002).
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"commercial interests," would be like trying to prove the proposition that
"bankers were strongly allied with depositors." The bar elite in the nineteenth
century was in part defined, as it is today, by the wealth, social standing, and
economic importance of its principal clients. Lawyers invested in their clients'
business ventures, drew on them to finance their political campaigns, and
intermarried with their families. 6 Such connections do not, of course, mean that
lawyers who became judges were nothing more than mouthpieces and deputies of
their former clients, or that in their roles as interpreters of statutes and developers
of common and constitutional law they were incapable of taking a somewhat
independent line on what the law required. But they were usually drawn from the
same strata of society and shared the same general ways of thinking about what
the public interest required.
In their ways of thinking, however, the "commercial interests" themselves
were more divided than Horwitz's treatment allows, and divided especially by
views on the proper role law should play in economic development and the
primacy of economic growth over competing values. In one of the most valuable,
though unaccountably and undeservedly neglected, of the many works inspired by
the Horwitz thesis, a pioneering study by Tony Freyer of antebellum law and
lawyers in New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania discovered sharp
conflicts between corporate "capitalists" and local "producers" over how
economic development should proceed and who should bear its costs. The
"producers" and their lawyers continued to maintain and defend interests in
equitable distribution of the proceeds of economic growth and a moralized view of
political economy as an instrument of values such as republican citizenship and
community cohesion. In legal contests, because of their commonality of interest
7
with local juries, the producers were often able to triumph over the capitalists.
The thesis about the social effects of changes in legal rules is obviously a lot
more complicated. For example, Horwitz argued that tort law in this period
shifted from a strict liability (or presumption of compensation for harm) to a
negligence standard, with the result that industrial defendants were effectively
immunized from liability.8 In one of the extensive empirical critiques, Gary
Schwartz challenged this conclusion, maintaining that fault liability had always
been the norm and pointing out that plaintiffs won many of the tort cases, though
he conceded that workers generally lost.9 Subsequent work, not available to
Horwitz or his critics in the 1970s, has clarified that both these positions are pretty
much beside the point, because the effective prevailing standard in tort-

6. For illustrative studies, see e.g. Maurice Baxter, One and Inseparable: Daniel Webster and the
Union (Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press 1984); Alfred S. Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum
Boston, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1119 (1988); R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story:

Statesman of the Old Republic (U. N.C. Press 1985).
7. See generally Tony A. Freyer, Producersversus Capitalists:ConstitutionalConflict in Antebellum

America (U. Press Va. 1994).
8. Horwitz, supran. 3, at 97-108.

9. See Gary Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A
Reinterpretation,90 Yale L. 1717 (1981).
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especially personal injury-cases until late in the nineteenth century was neither
strict liability nor negligence, but effectively no liability. For a variety of reasons
(employer paternalism, strong disincentives to sue employers, low levels of rightsconsciousness, conservative judges, lawyers' fees, witness disqualification rules,
etc.) almost nobody ever sued.' When the injured eventually did begin to litigate,
it turns out, the damages and settlements they recovered were so low as to be

almost derisory."
Other work has further complicated Horwitz's thesis of a "subsidy" to
capitalists affected by immunity or low damage awards for nuisances and takings
by eminent domain. Nuisance doctrine remained schizophrenic throughout the
nineteenth century, sometimes awarding compensation or injunctions to
neighboring landowners for damage from nearby mining and manufacturing
operations and sometimes denying them. 12 Freyer found that local landowners
who invoked statutory proceedings for assessing compensation for takings by
corporate enterprises were often able to recover more than market value because
of the sympathy of the local assessors.13 Appeals to the courts (some of whose
judges were indeed investors in developers' ventures, but who were politically
connected to local "producer" as well as "capitalist"
interests) sometimes lowered
4
such assessments, but usually upheld them.'

Some reviews challenged Horwitz's doctrinal rather than his (implicit) social
history. The most prominent of these was Brian Simpson's critique of Horwitz's
thesis on the transformation of contract law. 15 Horwitz-I am simplifying an
intricate technical quarrel-argued that contract law shifted from an eighteenthcentury pattern in which juries enforced contracts according to community-based
moral expectations of fair and equitable exchange, to a mid-nineteenth century
pattern of awarding expectation damages for breach of the strict terms of express
executory promises. He described in short a shift from enforcement of bargains
on fair terms to enforcement of the "will of the parties" as expressed in the formal
terms of their agreements. Simpson said that Horwitz was wrong to see the will or
10. See generally Robert B. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation,15 Ga. L. Rev. 925 (1981); Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: PersonalInjury Law
in the Late 19th Century, 1987 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 351 (1987); John Fabian Witt, Toward a New
History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-party Insurance
Movement, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 690 (2001).
11. Friedman, supra n. 10, at 365-67.
12. See e.g. Robert Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrinein American Nuisance Law: 1850 to
1920, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1101 (1986). Bone discusses a classic set of cases that deal with the protracted
litigation between Sanderson, a landowner, and the Pennsylvania Coal Co. In the first case the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed the landowner to enjoin a coal company from emitting coal dust
that polluted the plaintiff's stream, on the ground that the plaintiff had an absolute right to undisturbed
enjoyment of his property. Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 86 Pa. 401 (1878). Eight years later, the same
court, in a fourth decision with the same parties before it on the same facts, refused to give any remedy
on the ground that the coal company had an absolute right to make "natural" use of its property, which
in its case was mining coal, notwithstanding any "incidental" damage to its neighbors. Sanderson v. Pa.
Coal Co., 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
13. Freyer, supra n. 7, at 152.
14. Id. at 160-65.
15. A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533
(1979).
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consent theory as a nineteenth century innovation; it was already embedded in
common law contract doctrine by the mid-eighteenth century. What Horwitz was
seeing, Simpson suggested, was something quite different, not a change in the law,
but the "progressive dethronement of the jury," "accompanied by the generation
or reception of law in order not so much to replace or transform older doctrine as
to provide law where before there was little or none. 16
In the same year as Simpson's article, however, the Horwitz thesis received a
significant hormone boost from Patrick Atiyah's massive Rise and Fallof Freedom
of Contract (1979), which told a story similar to Horwitz's about the evolution of
modern English contract law. Through the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, Atiyah said, the law of contractual obligations was largely a law
enforcing equitable returns (what we would now call reliance or restitution
interests) for already executed contract performances. Only in the nineteenth
century did the executory contract, and legal enforcement of parties' mutually
agreed-upon promises, become the "paradigm of contract theory."' 7 In 1992,
James Oldham judiciously reviewed the entire controversy in his edition of the
manuscripts of Lord Mansfield, the great eighteenth-century English commercial
law judge. Oldham granted to Simpson and his allies their point about contract
doctrine: the consent theory and the action on the executory promise had certainly
been recognized in legal doctrine by Mansfield's time. But, Oldham said, the
"great majority" of the decided cases of the time largely support the HorwitzAtiyah story, since the contracts actually sued on were mostly executed contracts
and "contract and quasi-contract were congenial parts of an overall philosophy of
moral transactional behavior that required the honoring of legitimately created
expectations and the return of benefits unjustly acquired."' 8
More interesting, however, were the reviews that did not just criticize the
book, or try to pick apart its arguments and evidence, but that obviously hated it.
The book genuinely affronted them-much as readers had been by Beard's had
affronted his readers-and for similar reasons. Horwitz had committed a sort of
sacrilege. As John Reid put it, speaking of Horwitz as one of a new clan of leftwing historians, "The iconoclasts have invaded the temple of legal history. They
have smashed the fetishes, blotted out the frescoes, and desecrated the tombs. If
we do not force them to the evidence, they will even desacralize Clio."' 9 This was
not quite as good as one of the headlines greeting Charles Beard's book,
"SCAVENGERS, HYENA-LIKE, DESECRATE THE DEAD PATRIOTS WE
REVERE,"''2 but it was in the same spirit. As Beard had pulled down the
Founders from their lofty perch of disinterested farsighted statesmen, and recast
16. Idat 600.
17. P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fallof Freedom of Contract419 (Clarendon Press of Oxford U. Press

1979).
18. James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscriptsand the Growth of the Law in the Eighteenth Century
vol. 1, 228,231 (U. N.C. Press 1992).
19. John Reid, A Plot Too Doctrinaire,55 Tex. L. Rev. 1307,1321 (1977).
20. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical
Profession 96 (Cambridge U. Press 1988) (quoting a Headline in the Marion, Ohio Star).
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them as men with property in speculation to gain or lose in the new political
arrangements of the republic, so too had Horwitz charged that judges of the early
republic, the "Golden Age" or "Formative Period of American Law" with
participation in a grubby conspiracy to line, if not their own pockets, those of
commercial or entrepreneurial elites. Horwitz's narrative, in short, ran sharply
and rudely into some of the dominant narratives, and the collision hurt.
What were the prevailing narratives? Horwitz in an earlier iconoclastic
essay2' had identified some of them as the "conservative tradition" in American
legal historiography: a practice of extolling the great judges of the past as
guardians of the common law tradition-a "taught tradition," as Roscoe Pound
had called it, celebrated as autonomous from political pressures and economic
forces, a tradition of purely legal reasoning about purely legal principles, and yet
despite (or rather because of) that the great source of limits on popular impulses
to level and redistribute property. John Reid's review spoke for that tradition in
its suggestion (which Reid however oddly attributed to Willard Hurst) that
nineteenth century courts, so far from conspiring with any set of economic
interests, "acted as neutral referees, intervening only when one party appealed a
question from the marketplace, otherwise permitting contending groups to fight
for economic survival without close supervision as long as they did so by certain,
general rules. '' 2 Strangely enough, though, it was not until many years later that
the authentic ghost of Roscoe Pound materialized in Peter Karsten's Heartversus
Head (1997) to reproach Horwitz for having failed to understand that judges
decide out of doctrinally stable principle, not ideology or material interest or even
just the desire to pursue specific policies such as economic growth.23 The main
burden of the most severe critiques, including Reid's, was not so much that the
judges had been instrumental, but that their work's aims and results were to
"subsidize" entrepreneurs and "redistribute" in favor of the rich.
Indeed, had the rest of Transformation I's story remained in the key of
Horwitz's opening chapter, I suspect the storm would have been avoided. The
book begins with the story of how American judges shift from a view of law as
found to law as made, law as a self-conscious engine of social policy. The next
chapters identify the main policy as economic development. Judges posed as
defenders of vested property rights, when in fact they were Schumpeterian
entrepreneurs, destroyers of established property rights, and agents of their

21. Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17

Am. J. Leg. History 275 (1973).
22. Reid, supra n. 19, at 1321. In a similar spirit, see Randall Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American
legal History: a Comment on Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, and the
Common Law in America, 53 Ind. L. Rev. 449, 496 (1978) (the common law is a "largely self-ordering
system supportive of autonomous individual behavior and experiment, adjusting itself with the aid of
limited judicial intervention that does not effectively elevate the narrow interests of 'caste or class').
23. Peter Karsten, Heart versus Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth Century America (U. N.C.
Press 1997). Karsten did not, however, argue that common law judges functioned in a wholly
autonomous and socially insulated legal sphere. Occasionally they were motivated to soften the cold
reason of the law by considerations of fairness and equity (the "Heart" of his title) grounded in

Christian morality. But they never seem to have been motivated by political views or allegiances.
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reassignment to dynamic developers. Horwitz's story breaks here with the older
"conservative traditions"-that judges are guided by principle and that they side
with established property. But it is perfectly continuous and consistent with the
"commonwealth histories" of Oscar and Mary Handlin, Carter Goodrich, Louis
Hartz, and the social-legal histories of Willard Hurst and Harry Scheiber, 24
uncovering a long history of government and legal system promotion of economic
development in the early republic and pointing out that it favored dynamic
property, not vested property, entrepreneurial rather than rentier interests.
Horwitz's TransformationI fit nicely into this line of work by documenting more
thoroughly the contribution of the courts, and legal doctrines in decisions and
treatises, to this promotional enterprise.
The difference between Horwitz's narrative and theirs was in part that he
was much darker and depressive about the outcomes, because he took a
fundamentally dimmer view of capitalist development.2 (Beard's crime, similarly,
was not that he had suggested that the Founders sought to protect property rights
against the mob, but that he suggested there was something wrong with that.)
These were the vibes the most hostile reviewers picked up and reacted against. I
have often heard critics call Horwitz's work "Marxist," though I have never been
able to see much of anything Marxist about it, no suggestion whatsoever for
example that "in the last instance" struggles between classes produced by
dominant relations of production determine social relations or ideological
superstructures such as legal doctrines. It seems a more idealist than Marxist
story: the lawyers and judges had a choice to make, and they chose to ally
themselves with business interests rather than the republican ideals of the
Revolution.
Horwitz is drawing on different background narratives of the history of
industrial capitalism. One, pretty clearly, is E.P. Thompson's narrative of how the
working-class world of English craft artisans was crushed; and how "the moral
economy of the English crowd," a communitarian ideology of fair prices and
wages and equitable distribution of scarce basic commodities in times of dearth,
enforced by the legal system through local magistrates, was displaced by a
heartless laissez-faire regime of market prices and wages.26 Another is Karl
24. Oscar Handlin & Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth, A Study of the Role of Governmentin the
American Economy: Massachusetts,1774-1861 (rev. ed., Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press 1969); Carter
Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 (Greenwood Publg.
Group 1960); Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought. Pennsylvania1776-1860 (Chi.
Quadrangle 1948); Hurst's works, supra n. 1; Harry N. Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of

Governmentand the Economy, 1820-1861 (Ohio U. Press 1987).
25. Not, by the way, that his predecessors were wholly complacent. Hartz had described with biting
clarity how mid-century corporations had appropriated the Jacksonians' originally anti-corporate

individualist ideology and turned it in their favor against state regulation. Hartz, supra n. 24, at 113-22.
Hurst, a Progressive New Dealer-far from calling nineteenth century law either efficient or just-said

it exuded a "bastard pragmatism" focused on short-term gain and oblivious to larger social ends.
Hurst, Law and Economic Growth,supra n. 1, at 34-37 and passim. Scheiber described how courts had

aided the expropriation of property on behalf of transport companies. Harry N. Scheiber, Property
Law, Expropriation,andResource Allocation by Government The United States, 1789-1910,33 J. Econ.

History 232 (1973).
26. E. P. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, in E. P.
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Polanyi's brilliant and terrifying narrative of industrial capitalism in The Great
Transformation (1944), as a total pulverizing of traditional social ties and social
life and the conversion of all social relations into relations of calculated exchange
of commodities in impersonal markets. The spirits of Thompson and Polanyi loom
most visibly over Horwitz's chapter on contract law, with its story of communal
conceptions of fair exchange being supplanted by the "will theory" and the legal
enforcement of contracts on whatever terms one party could demand or compel
from another. 27 But they are present throughout the entire book. When Hurst
wrote of law's displacing "vested rights," he was thinking of rentier landlords and
fox-hunting squires. Horwitz implicitly presents a more Thompsonian story, of
customary expectations of fair prices, and of traditional collective use-rights; of
juries settling disputes among neighbors according to communal norms, rather
than remote judges enforcing rules favoring commercial strangers and outsiders
and unconcerned with equity and morality. And surely, in Horwitz's identification
of the winners and losers from capitalist development, there is more than a hint of
Charles Beard's economic populism. Horwitz was reaching back into the histories
of the Progressive period and the 1930s, and the new left-wing social histories of
the 1960s, for narratives to fuel his rebellion against the scholarship of the 1950s,
the pages of yesteryear when consensus-minded Cold Warriors kept law and order
on the fields of historical scholarship.
Still other background presences to his book are cheering his rebellion from
1950s legal scholarship: the Legal Realists of the 1920s and 30s and contemporary
work of the Critical Legal Studies movement, of which he was one of the founders
and most eminent members. The signs of these influences are in his distrustindeed disgust-with legal formalism, meaning here, the pose of judges and
treatise-writers that they are speaking for a general, apolitical, neutral body of
legal principles. Such principles always conceal, for Horwitz, a right-wing political
agenda and ideological bias. He was even led to a severe criticism of the admired
E.P. Thompson. In the concluding chapter of Whigs and Hunters (1975)-a
generally Beardian book about how the English upper-class had twisted and
manipulated the law to divest traditional rights to take deer, graze cattle, and
glean corn from harvests, to protect the landowner's absolute and enclosed
property, and to punish customs as crimes-Thompson ended with an unexpected
paean of praise for the "rule of law" as an "unqualified human good"-for all its
abuses, a great western institution that limits the rulers as well as the ruled. 28 The
formalist view of the rule of law, Horwitz chided, always conceals inequalities of
wealth and power under a facade of formal equality, and delegitimates attempts to
remedy such inequalities.29
For their part, some of Horwitz's critics were speaking out of competing

Thompson, Customs in Common 185 (New Press 1993).
27. Horwitz, supra n. 3, at 160-88.
28. E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 258-69 (Pantheon Books

1975).
29. Morton Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An UnqualifiedHuman Good?, 86 Yale LJ.561,566 (1977).
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narratives of their own, some old, some new. Reid very straightforwardly adopted
the traditional narrative of American legal-economic development as progress
away from feudalism and mercantilism and toward economic liberalism. For
Reid, the law's shift from enforcing just prices to express promises was a lifting of
restraints on commerce and freedom. Similarly Chief Justice Shaw's decision in
Farwell,3 immunizing employers from vicarious liability for harms caused by
fellow-servants, on the ground that workers had impliedly contracted to assume
the risk-which Horwitz had called a redistributive rule-change subsidizing
railroads at the expenses of workers-was, for Reid, simply the fulfillment of the
Revolution's principle of freedom of contract: "the individual, free to enter or
reject a perilous employment, was made responsible for his own decisions. 31
Another of Horwitz's hostile critics, Stephen Williams, then a professor at
Colorado law school, now a distinguished federal judge, attacked him from the
perspective of Chicago law-and-economics, in a review called Doubtful Economics
Makes Doubtful History. Williams made some valuable points: he was really
puzzled about why Horwitz would want to privilege stable property rights in first
occupiers, such as riparian users or farmers, against later-competing users. I agree
that this preference, in a man generally speaking of the left, for absolute property
rights (and pre-commercial societies) is a little hard to understand: it makes sense,
I think, only in a Polanyi/Thomson narrative in which such stable use rights are
aspects of stable communities. It also makes sense to an ironic narrative-one in
which judges and lawyers totally committed to preserving absolute property rights
end up totally subverting them. Williams also asked some good analytic questions:
when can a set of legal rule changes with distributional impacts be labeled
"subsidies?" What's the baseline? And he also filled a gap Horwitz had left by
summarizing some data from economic history about changes in income and
wealth distribution in the antebellum United States, though the data was. too
aggregate to either confirm or refute Horwitz's basic thesis, and of course shed no
light either way on how, if at all, legal rule-changes affected basic distributive
shares. 32 But Williams's more basic point was to express doubt that law had

30. Farwellv. Boston & WorcesterPR., 45 Mass. 49 (1842) (opinion of Shaw, CJ.).

31. Reid, supra n. 19, at 1317. Reid reasonably asks the historian to interpret the fellow-servant
rule in the light of contemporary, rather than modem, views of freedom of contract. Even doing that,
however, it is difficult to reconcile the fellow-servant cases with doctrines being developed at the same
time to deal with contracts between railroads and shippers and passengers, which explicitly refuse to
allow the railroads to contract out of liability even expressly, on the grounds that the other parties have

no real opportunity to withhold consent from such contracts.

Even in mid-nineteenth century

America, the problems of the one-sided contract of adhesion were perceptible, if only selectively so, to

the legal system.
32. Stephen Williams, TransformingAmerican Law: Doubtful Economics Makes Doubtful History,
25 UCLA L. Rev. 1187, 1210-11 (1978). Williams reported the evidence from economic history as

showing no significant changes in wealth distribution in the antebellum United States. A more recent
review of the data indicates however that "[a]ll the fragments of unsatisfactory evidence taken together

may justify a conclusion that wealth inequality increased somewhat during the nineteenth century, at
least in the antebellum period." Clayne Pope, Inequality in the Nineteenth Century, in The Cambridge
Economic History of the United States vol. 2,109,135 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds.,

Cambridge U. Press 2000); Jenny Wahl, Twice-told Tales: An Economist's Re-telling of The
Transformationof American Law, 1780-1860,37 Tulsa L. Rev. 881 (2002).
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become more instrumental (or "utilitarian") in the early nineteenth century. He
drew on a competing narrative, this one of Chicago law-and-economics (which was
I believe itself a completely unconsciously repeating of a nineteenth century
narrative of the progressive evolution of the common law) to the effect that the
"common law" was generally both utilitarian and efficient, indeed had been
efficient for many centuries, as in its long struggle against restraints on
alienation. 33 This argument surely proved a bit too much. For if the law is
efficient when it loosens feudal restraints, how can it be efficient when it creates
them? And if the law is efficient when it does away with just-price doctrines and
enforces contracts according to their strict terms, what was it before it thus
reformed itself? If the Mill Acts are efficient because, by converting property to
liability rules, they prevent holdout landowners from thwarting progress by
injunction, why did the rule have to change?
In hindsight perhaps the most surprising fact about the reviews of
TransformationI is that Horwitz's severest critics came mostly from the right, not
the left. The book appeared after all in 1977, in the full flowering of post-1960s
social history "from the bottom up." One would have expected some critics to
fault Horwitz's book for focusing on the quarrels of white men who could afford
to fight cases to appeal, and leaving out all the law of social relations of novel
concern-the law of slavery, indentured servants, the employment relation and
labor organizing, the law of sex roles, marriage and the family, the criminal law as
an agent of social repression and discipline. The closest to such a critique was
Wythe Holt's, but in the course of an exceptionally warm and generous overall
review. 34 The answer must be that in the 1970s and 80s the space for any kind of
legal left was very small, Horwitz was one of its few occupants, and for once leftwing scholars passed up the usually irresistible opportunity to savage one of their
own.
The reception accorded to Horwitz's second volume, The Transformation of
American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy ("TransformationI'), 3
was altogether different in kind. I found only one really hostile review, by the
conservative lawyer Bruce Fein in The Washington Times, which dismissed
Horwitz's intellectual history as a story of scholastic disputes, and provided a
delicious illustration of the continuing power of "classical" ideology by dismissing
all Progressive statutory innovations on the common law-such as minimum wage
laws-as rent seeking by special interests trying to get themselves a better deal
than they could get through the market.36 Most of the major reviews, 37 while
33. Williams, supra n. 32, at 1200-05.
34. Holt, supra n. 5, at 719-22.
35. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy (Oxford U. Press 1992).
36. Bruce Fein, Straining to Bring Forth a Legal Gnat, Wash. Times G3 (Aug. 13,1992).
37. See e.g. Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102
Yale L.J. 1019 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive Transformation,6 Yale J.L. & Humanities 137
(1994); James Kloppenberg, The Theory and Practice of American Legal History, 106 Harv. L. Rev.
1332 (1993); John Henry Schlegel, A Tasty Tidbit, 41 Buffalo L. Rev. 1047 (1993); G. Edward White,
TransformingHistory in the PostmodernEra,91 Mich. L. Rev. 1315 (1993).
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politely challenging, were exceedingly respectful, as if trying to temper the
howling winds that had surrounded Transformation L Their emphasis was also
different. The reviews of TransformationI centered, I have argued, on a conflict
of narratives. Those of Transformation 11 were much more about methodology,
and especially the vexed connections, on which Horwitz now had a very different
take, between intellectual and social history.
Transformation I was mostly about doctrine, and argued that doctrine
caused social change. TransformationI1 was mostly about the more abstract legal
"thought" of treatises and articles, and argued a more complex view of its relation
to social change. In TransformationII legal thought sometimes rationalized and
legitimated social changes that had already taken place. But sometimes it
influenced future social change by operating as an ideological filter of reality as its
categories and assumptions shaped the ideological lens through which lawyers
looked, one that conditioned their views of what was possible and desirable, public
and private, coercive pressure and free contract, faulty or innocent conduct, cause
and accident.
Like TransformationI, Transformation11 drew upon background narratives.
One remained the standard Progressive story of how Progressive (including Legalrealist) jurists had challenged the socially conservative formalism of "Classical
Legal Thought" (though Horwitz complicated the picture by showing that
classical-individualism had actually been hostile to corporate concentration).
Another narrative, worked out with his colleague Duncan Kennedy, 8 explained
the main contribution of Realism as the smashing of the public-private distinction
in classical law, the insight most shrewdly developed by Robert Hale that no legal
regime is neutral, and no market is "free," that all legal regimes including "laissezfaire," enable some interests to command and coerce and injure others by means
of state power.39
But there were two meta-narratives as well, which shaped Horwitz's project
much as he argued legal thought had shaped twentieth century legal doctrines and
policies. One was borrowed from Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962), and its theory of paradigm shifts generated by the
accumulating strain of disconfirming and anomalous events: at some point, the
strain is too much, the old theories lose their plausibility and fall apart, and new
ones that appear to promise a more powerful and coherent account of perceived
realities supplant them. The other came from Peter Novick's remarkable history
of American history-writing in the twentieth century, That Noble Dream (1988), in
which, one might say, Novick brought the methods of legal-realism to bear on the
historical profession's claims to objectivity in historical scholarship. Between
them, Kuhn and Novick helped supply Horwitz with both a story-line for his new

38. Kennedy's path-breaking and widely influential thesis of his legal history course materials is
briefly summarized in Duncan Kennedy, Toward a HistoricalUnderstandingof Legal Conciseness: The
Case of ClassicalLegal Thought in America, 1850-1940,3 Research L. and Sociology 3 (1980).

39. The best treatment of Hale's ideas is Barbara Fried, The Assault on Laissez-Faire:Robert Hale
and the FirstLaw and Economics Movement (Harv. U. Press 1998).
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book as well as a set of heroes and villains. The story-line was that of the fall of
Classical Legal Thought (or formalism), its critique and partial supplanting with
Progressive legal thought. This was a Kuhnian narrative. But it was followed by
another-the resurgence of legal formalism in the postwar legal system and legal
academy. In science, dead paradigms stay dead. In law, they never really get
killed off, but hang around and Dracula-like, rise from their coffins to stalk the
earth. Horwitz's villains, in the new narrative, were still those of Transformation
I-the forces of legal formalism, resurgent in the postwar world as Herbert
Wechsler's "neutral principles," the "legal process school of jurisprudence," and
several generations of purportedly value-free social science, from legal-realist
empiricism to law-and-economics. The heroes were the jurists that Novick called
"cognitive relativists," fully aware of the value-laden, theory-dependent,
necessarily political character of all tools for understanding and regulating the
social world, shorn of the illusion that law is or ever can be objectively interpreted
or apolitically neutral among contending interests and policies.
Hovering above these two meta-narratives was another methodological
commitment, Horwitz's general dislike of overly complex stories and explanations.
This commitment too has its roots in the revolt against the 1950s, when historical
scholarship worshipped complexity-irony, multiplicity, particularism-as the
antidote to the simplifications of "ideology." The cult of complexity in the 1950s,
of the tragic sense of limits on human possibilities, as Peter Novick put it, "with its
inevitable strong suggestion that any but the most piecemeal and modest tinkering
with the social mechanism was ill-fated"4--had led into conservative resignation,
either complacent or depressed, to the status quo. By way of recoil, Horwitz took
from this account a strong preference for clear, vigorous and stripped-down
narratives and explanations. This commitment led him to his sharpest point of
disagreement with colleagues in Critical Legal Studies, who were disposed to
argue that the association of any given set of legal doctrines or principles methods
with legal-political outcomes was never anything but contingent, because types of
legal argument could be "flipped" so as to be turned to any imaginable purpose.
No, Horwitz said: at any given time, legal-argument-types-such as doctrines of
causation or absolute-property or strict-liability or the real-entity theory of the
corporation-tend to favor privilege, have an inbuilt "tilt" towards particular
outcomes and not others.41 The master-tilt for the second half of Transformation
I!-which if I am not mistaken is completely contrary to or at least very different
from the master-tilt of TransformationI and the first half of Transformation11 (in
which formalists appear as "Old Conservative" individualists hostile to corporate
enterprise)-is that formalism, whether of Classical Legal Thought, empirical
social science, neutral principles, or law-and-economics, is inherently conservative,
and relativism socially progressive. Horwitz's recent short book on the Warren
Court carries this theme forward by characterizing the Court as intentionally
40. Novick, supra n. 20, at 324.
41. See e.g. Horwitz, supra n. 35, at 106 (discussing ideological uses of legal theories of the
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committed to policy-making for an instrumental purpose, the strengthening of
democracy-rather than as, let us say, the elaboration of natural rights. 42
I have gone into all this because I believe it was precisely this combination of
narrative, meta-narrative, and methodological commitments that gave rise to most
of the-as I say, comparatively very gentle-quarrels between Horwitz and the
reviewers of Transformation 11. They-and I was one of them-found the
paradigms too monolithic, the paradigm-shifts too sharp, and the identification of
theoretical with political positions (the major "tilts") too neat. What is one to
make of Holmes, for example, a radical skeptic about legal objectivity, but in most
respects a rock-ribbed political and economic conservative? Or Morris Cohen, a
liberal in politics, but strenuous anti-relativist in methodology? Or Thurman
Arnold, an almost pure nominalist in legal theory, a scientific positivist in
economic theory, and an ultra-orthodox promoter of competitive capitalism as
antitrust chief? More generally, have not most of the great progressive sociallegal movements in the American tradition-for universal suffrage, the abolition
of slavery and racial segregation, the emancipation of women, labor's rights to
organize and strike-drawn upon wholly abstract and formal conceptions of
natural equal rights to liberty and justice?
But on one point even the most negative reviewers of Horwitz's two books
agreed.
This was substantial, original, path-breaking work. Even when
apparently mistaken in matters of fact or problematic in matters of interpretation,
this was work that probed deeply and provoked, and by so doing aroused legal
and historical scholars to wakefulness and effort as well as protest and praise.
They might challenge or disagree with it, angrily or respectfully, but they felt they
had to engage with it, and by so doing stimulated a large part of the great new
flourishing of legal history that began in the late 1970s and is still going strong.
Morton Horwitz did a lion's share of the initial hard work, mixed the brew, and
stirred the pot. We all owe him a tremendous debt.

42. Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the PursuitofJustice 114-15 (Hill & Wang 1998).
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